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Information and Opportunistic Behavior in  
Federal Crop Insurance Programs 
 
Abstract 
Opportunistic behavior in crop insurance can arise due to asymmetric information between 
producers and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.  Producers who insure fields using 
transitional yields based on county average yields or who select options such as buy-up coverage 
or revenue insurance may increase their return from crop insurance.  Using field-level crop 
insurance contract data for several crops in five growing regions, we find evidence that 
producers can profit from using buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, and transitional yields and 
that the level of producer opportunism is crop but not necessarily land-quality specific and is 
greater due to premium subsidization.   
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Information and Opportunistic Behavior in  
Federal Crop Insurance Programs 
 
Production of agricultural commodities involves many types of risk.  Agricultural producers may 
purchase crop insurance in order to reduce yield and/or revenue risk.  Prior to 1994, the crop 
insurance program experienced very low participation as the program offered insurance for a 
relatively small number of products and coverage levels, and offered little premium 
subsidization.  Through the Agricultural Reform Act of 1994 and the Agricultural Risk 
Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000, Congress attempted to entice producer participation in crop 
insurance by increasing premium subsidies.  Policymakers argued that the increased participation 
due to premium subsidies would eliminate ad hoc disaster payments or emergency aid (Ker 
2001).  Participation in crop insurance has increased.  In 1998 more than 180 million acres of 
farmland was insured under the program, more than three times the acreage insured in 1988 
(USDA-RMA Bulletin).  The participation incentives created from the higher subsidy levels, 
however, may also increase the likelihood of opportunistic behavior.  Producer opportunism 
results in larger indemnities being paid to producers, which in turn increases taxpayer outlays.  
Reducing producer opportunistic behavior creates a more efficient risk management program 
that limits the ability of producers to extract profits from participating. 
Asymmetric information between producers and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation 
(FCIC) may allow producers to engage in opportunistic behavior.
1  Producer insurance decisions 
such as buy-up coverage and revenue insurance can potentially increase producer return from 
crop insurance when producers have a better understanding of crop yield risk on their farms than 
                                                 
1 Asymmetric information exists when one party in a transaction has more (or better) information than the other 
party.  
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the FCIC.
2  Producers without proven yields, who insure fields by using the prescribed 
alternative, transitional yields (T-yields) based on the county average yield, can potentially 
increase their indemnity when their expected yield falls sufficiently below the county average 
yield.  In this article we examine whether evidence of producer opportunism exists in field-level 
crop insurance data from the use of buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, and T-yields.  
Asymmetric information can result in producer opportunism through both adverse 
selection and moral hazard.  Adverse selection occurs when “hidden information” exists and 
moral hazard occurs if producers take “hidden action” (Arrow 1985).  Generally, we label 
opportunistic behavior as adverse selection if the producer uses asymmetric information to their 
advantage in making the insurance decision and moral hazard if the producer changes behavior 
because they have insurance.  It is often difficult to distinguish empirically between adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton 1993), and we do not specifically 
identify type of asymmetric information.  Instead, we examine whether evidence exists that 
asymmetric information increases producers’ return from crop insurance. 
Several authors address the impact of asymmetric information on the use of crop 
insurance.  Roberts, Key, and O’Donoghue (2006) find evidence of moral hazard in yields of 
insured wheat and soybean farms in Texas.  Smith and Goodwin (1996) show that adopters of 
crop insurance exhibit moral hazard behavior by using fewer inputs than non-adopters.  Their 
findings counter those of Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), who conclude that crop insurance 
participants use higher rates of inputs than non-participants, suggesting that both fertilizer and 
pesticides may be risk-increasing inputs.  Makki and Somwaru (2001) suggest adverse selection 
exists in both coverage-level and insurance type decisions.  High-risk producers more often 
                                                 
2 Buy-up coverage refers to any coverage level above 50 percent.   
  
  4 
 
select revenue insurance contracts and higher coverage levels.    Skees and Reed (1986) also 
identify adverse selection due to asymmetric information in the relationship between the 
producer’s choice of coverage level and expected yields, and in the bias introduced in coverage 
protection when trends are not used to establish expected yields.  Just, Calvin, and Quiggin 
(1999) find that the subsidy benefits of crop insurance outweigh its risk-aversion incentive 
largely due to adverse selection. 
Our study of producer opportunism in crop insurance adds to the previous literature in 
three important ways: we address the impact of using T-yields on producer opportunism; we 
analyze effects from the subsidy on producer opportunism; and we use more detailed, field-level 
crop insurance and performance data to analyze these effects as well as the impact of purchasing 
buy-up coverage or revenue insurance.  This type of data has only been used previously by 
Roberts, Key, and O’Donoghue (2006). 
Field-level data allows us to better estimate the extent of producer opportunistic behavior 
specific to crop insurance contract decisions.  A unit represents a parcel of land insured 
independently of other parcels (Edwards, 2003a).  Producers can insure a crop by the unit 
(typically a field) or the entire farm.  Heterogeneous farms, i.e., farms that include field units 
with different average yields, provide better opportunities for opportunistic behavior from the 
use of buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, and T-yields.  In our study, we use unit insurance 
information whereas other studies have generally used either farm or county-level data. 
Since asymmetric information may enable producers to increase their returns, the results 
from this study could have important implications for policy makers.  A positive relationship 
between the use of buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, or T-yields and return from crop 
insurance demonstrates the value to producers of using this asymmetric information.  If such  
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opportunistic behavior occurs, some relatively simple re-designing of crop insurance programs 
could reduce the farmer’s ability to use buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, or T-yields to 
generate extraordinary indemnity payments. 
This article proceeds as follows.  We first outline how a producer can manipulate the 
yield guarantee, or the minimum yield that results in an indemnity payment, to allow for 
producer opportunism possibilities.  We then present hypotheses relating producer insurance 
decisions to opportunistic behavior.  A description of our model, data, and analysis follows.  We 
present and interpret findings in the results section.  Conclusions and a discussion of implications 
occur in the final section. 
 
Insurance Characteristics 
In this section we outline both the details of crop insurance and how the yield guarantee 
decisions may allow for producer opportunism.  Two primary types of insurance exist – yield 
and revenue.  Yield insurance insures only against low yield.  Revenue insurance insures against 
the combination of yield and price.  At the beginning of each crop year, the producer can change 
insurance type.  Return per acre from crop insurance depends on the difference between what a 
producer receives as an indemnity and pays for the insurance: hj hj hj W I R − = , where 
hj R represents the return,  hj I represents the indemnity, and  hj W represents the crop insurance 
premium for field h and crop j.   
An indemnity payment for yield insurance, also known as multiple peril crop insurance 
(MPCI), occurs if the yield guarantee,  hj YG , is greater than actual production,  hj AP .  When this 
happens, the FCIC calculates the indemnity as  j hj hj hj PE AP YG I × − = ] [ , where  j PE represents 
the price election set by the government.    
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An indemnity payment for revenue insurance, specifically crop revenue coverage, occurs 
if the revenue guarantee is greater than actual producer revenue.  When this happens, the 
indemnity equals  ] * [ )] , max( * [ j hj j j hj hj HP AP HP BP YG I − = , where  j BP and  j HP represents 
the base and harvest price, respectively.
3  The base price represents the average daily settlement 
price of a futures contract during a month prior to planting.  Harvest price equals the average 
daily settlement prices of a futures contract during a month when the crop matures.  The choice 
of insurance type may lead to opportunistic behavior if the producer’s information allows 
him/her to predict indemnity payments on the insured field more accurately than the FCIC so 
that his/her expected profit is increased along with reducing risk. 
The yield guarantee for computing indemnity with either type of insurance represents a 
percentage of a producer’s actual production history, hj APH .  Establishing hj APH  yield requires 
a minimum of four and a maximum of 10 consecutive years of verifiable yield records for the 
crop on the insured field.  The FCIC calculates the yield guarantee for yield and revenue 
insurance as  hj j hj APH CL YG × = , where  j CL  represents coverage level.  The revenue 
guarantee ) ( hj RG is calculated as ) , max( * j j hj hj HP BP YG RG = .  The producer selects a 
coverage level specific to each crop.  Coverage levels typically range between 50 to 85 percent 
in 5 percent increments.  Producers can adjust coverage levels at the beginning of each crop year.   
The transitional yield (T-yield) option permits producers to enroll fields in the crop 
insurance program that have not previously or have only seldom been in production for a 
                                                 
3  An indemnity for income protection, another form of revenue insurance, is calculated using only the base price, 
] * [ ] * [ j hj j hj hj HP AP BP YG I − = .  For revenue assurance with the harvest price option, the indemnity is 
calculated the same as crop revenue coverage; without the harvest price option, the indemnity is calculated the same 
as income protection.  Even when the indemnity is calculated the same, revenue assurance and crop revenue 
coverage differ in the futures month used to calculate the harvest price.  Income protection and revenue assurance 
can also differ in applicable crops, coverage levels, and unit types.  Not all coverage levels and unit types are 
available for each revenue insurance type (Edwards, 2003b).  
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particular crop.  T-yields are based on the 10-year county average yield. Without an established 
actual production history, T-yields create the potential for producer opportunism when their 
expected yield falls sufficiently below the county average yield.  If the producer cannot provide 
the minimum of four years of actual yields for a field, a T-yield must be substituted for each 
missing year.  Depending on the number of T-yields a producer includes or the type of T-yield, 
the FCIC discounts the county average yield as much as 35 percent in determining the producer 
production history.  If the farmer’s expected yield on the field is sufficiently below the county 
average yield, the use of T-yields can be due to producer opportunism. 
 
Insurance Decisions and Opportunistic Behavior 
In our examination of producer opportunism in crop insurance, we examine three specific 
hypotheses.  We use these hypotheses to determine (1) whether the use of buy-up coverage, 
revenue insurance, or T-yields signals producer opportunism through financial indicators; (2) 
whether the presence of a subsidy affects the amount of producer opportunism; and (3) whether 
producer opportunism from the use of  buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, or T-yields is greater 
in regions with greater within-county land heterogeneity.  The specific hypotheses that we test 
and their justification follow. 
Hypothesis 1.  Return per acre increases with the use of buy-up coverage, revenue 
insurance, and T-yields.  We assess impacts on both producer return and social return, where we 
label producer return as the indemnity less producer premium and social return as the indemnity 
less total premium (including the federal subsidy).
4  We hypothesize that the use of buy-up 
coverage, revenue insurance, and T-yield increases both measures of return.  Impacts on 
producer return directly relate to measuring private producer opportunism while impacts on 
                                                 
4 The amount of producer premium is specific to each crop insurance contract.  
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social return allow the measurement of social consequences.  Further, we examine whether the 
use of additional T-yields has a greater impact on producer return and provides evidence of 
greater producer opportunism. 
Producers can select a unique coverage level for each crop based on perceived production 
risk and the cost of insurance for that coverage level.  Selecting a higher coverage level increases 
the yield guarantee and increases the probability of receiving an indemnity.  Since producers 
likely have a better idea of production risks associated with a crop grown on a particular field 
than the FCIC, opportunistic behavior may come from the higher yield guarantee.  Opportunistic 
behavior can occur when high risk producers expect a positive return from selecting high 
coverage levels, even though higher coverage levels result in higher premium costs.  More 
generally, we expect that a larger percentage of producers would select buy-up coverage levels in 
regions with higher crop production variability than in regions with lower variability. 
Producers can also select insurance type, i.e., yield or revenue, for each crop.  Without 
opportunism, producers select insurance type based upon perceived production risk, price risk, 
and the cost of the insurance type.  Revenue insurance has higher premium costs than MPCI 
since revenue insurance protects against a price decrease following planting in addition to low 
yield whereas MPCI only insures against low yield.  Opportunism with revenue insurance can 
occur if producers have more accurate information than the FCIC about the likelihood they will 
incur a yield loss and they also want to insure against a price drop.   
A producer most likely knows, or has a good idea of, the expected yield for each field 
s/he farms.  If the producer has been producing the insured crop on a field and has verifiable 
yield records, s/he must provide the yields from the field.  However, if the producer did not keep 
good records or claims failure to keep good records, s/he must employ T-yields to obtain  
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insurance.  Those with expected yields sufficiently below the county average may not only 
transfer risk but also increase expected profit from the field by purchasing insurance. 
Depending on the number of verifiable yield records and other circumstances, a producer 
may use one, two, three or four T-yields or special T-yields when purchasing crop insurance.
5  
Special T-yields permit a producer to use 100 percent (or in some cases 110 percent) of the 
county average yield when computing his/her T-yield.  Special T-yields are required if the 
producer has never participated in the crop insurance program or uses a new practice, type, or 
variety on additional land that has no production history in that crop.  The more transitional 
yields a producer includes in the APH, the less information s/he provides about true expected 
yields.  Thus, the amount of asymmetric information between the producer and the government 
increases.  The government takes this information into account by discounting county average 
yield more heavily when using a larger number of T-yields to compute APH.
6 
Hypothesis 2.  Subsidization of crop insurance promotes producer opportunism.  The 
government provides premium subsidies to reduce the cost of crop insurance and entice more 
producers to participate in the program.  Thus, subsidization may increase number of producers 
engaging in opportunistic behavior and the amount of total indemnities paid due to this 
opportunistic behavior.  We expect that subsidizing crop insurance increases the extent of 
producer opportunism because it increases the opportunities for, and the returns to, opportunism. 
Hypothesis 3.  Producer opportunism due to the use of buy-up coverage, revenue 
insurance, and T-yields is greater in regions with greater within-county land resource 
heterogeneity.  Soil and climate characteristics vary between geographic locations.  We examine 
                                                 
5 We analyze the six most widely used T-yield options.  Although not analyzed in this paper, the RMA offers other 
T-yield options such as personal transitional yield and T-yield for added insurable acreage by practice, type, or 
variety. 
6 The following percentages are used to determine APH when using T-yields: 100 percent of the county average for 
one T-yield, 90 percent for two T-yields, 80 percent for three T-yields, and 65 percent for four T-yields.  
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whether evidence of producer opportunism from the use of buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, 
and T-yields increases for regions with greater within-county land resource heterogeneity. 
Each county has a unique set of agro-climatic characteristics.  Land quality represents a 
particularly important determinant of land use and yields (Hardie and Parks 1997).  The FCIC 
calculates T-yields based on the county average yield.  Regions with highly variable land 
resources may have greater variability of within county yields.  The county average yield may 
not represent the average yield on many fields in such counties.  Producers often have more 
information about expected yields on fields without verifiable yield records than does the FCIC, 
which must rely on the county average yield.  Since producers also have private information 
about fields with verifiable yield records, they can use this information in deciding the optimal 
level of buy-up coverage and insurance type.  These information asymmetries between producers 
and the FCIC may allow producers to profit in the use of buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, 
and particularly in the use of T-yields, in counties with more heterogeneous within-county 
resources than in counties with more homogeneous within-county resources.  The use of T-yields 
in locations with heterogeneous within-county resources could provide a yield guarantee well 
above the field’s actual production ability and thereby inflate the yield guarantee to unachievable 
levels. 
 
Model, Data, and Analysis 
We now present the empirical model in which we identify variables, regions, crops, and data 
used in the analysis and outline the analytical procedures.  We expect return (both social return 
and producer return) to depend on county weather characteristics, growing degree days, county, 
year, crop, field practice (whether the land was in summer fallow the previous year), insurance  
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decisions (coverage level and insurance type), and number of T-yields used to create the APH. 
Growing degree days represents the only continuous variable.  We include a dummy variable for 
each county, year, crop, practice, coverage level, insurance type, and T-yields.  Each T-yield 
dummy variable represents one of the six possible ways to use T-yields. The number of dummy 
variables for county, insurance type, and crop depend on the region. We specify all equations in 
per-acre terms. Table 1 defines the variables used. 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following equation for each region: 
(1)  Y = DCYα + DYRδ + Xβ + TYγ + ε 
where Y represents the magnitude of return (either social return or producer return) at the field-
level; DCY  corresponds a matrix of county dummy variables used to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity in agricultural production; DYR refers to a matrix of year dummy variables;  X 
represents a matrix comprised of a vector of ones, growing degree days, and dummy variables 
for coverage level, insurance type, crop, and field practice; TY is a matrix of T-yield dummy 
variables ; α and δ  are, respectively, estimated county and year fixed-effects parameters; β and γ 
are estimated parameters; and ε  represents the error term.   
The data include observations of crop insurance contract information and corresponding 
performance records for all insured fields by the FCIC for each of eight years – 1995 through 
2002.  The data set includes all the information that the FCIC has for each crop insurance 
contract: indemnity amount, premium paid by producer, amount of subsidy, crop type, number of 
acres, field practice, coverage level, insurance type, year, county location of field, and type of 
APH (actual and/or T-yields).  
We analyze five different growing regions, two with relatively homogenous within-
county land resources (Iowa and Western Nebraska) and three with more heterogeneous land  
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resources (Oklahoma, North-Central Montana, and Eastern Washington).  The five growing 
regions produce some of the same crops, but the crop mix differs by area.  To document some of 
the differences in degree of heterogeneity, one could consider soil organic matter.  Soil organic 
matter represents an important indicator of soil quality and thus land resources (Pulleman et. al. 
2000).  Regions such as Oklahoma and North-Central Montana generally have lower amounts of 
soil organic matter and vary much more across relatively small areas such as counties than 
regions such as Iowa and Western Nebraska.  Eastern Washington has areas with high soil 
organic matter like Iowa and Western Nebraska but also exhibits high variability within counties 
like Oklahoma and North-Central Montana. 
We analyze the returns to four insurance types: one yield insurance (MPCI) and three 
types of revenue insurance - crop revenue coverage (crop rev coverage), revenue assurance, and 
income protection.  Each crop and region has a different set of available revenue insurance 
options.  We study the effects of the most popular revenue insurance product, crop rev coverage, 
for each of five major regions.  In addition to crop rev coverage, we analyzed revenue assurance 
in Oklahoma and Iowa, and income protection in Iowa.
7  Not analyzed in this paper, but 
available to producers during the study period, is hail insurance. 
Buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, and T-yields can potentially vary by crop type and 
field practice.  Thus, we differentiate these variables by several crop types: wheat, spring wheat, 
winter wheat, corn for grain (hereafter referred to as corn), soybeans, and “other crops.”   
                                                 
7 Income protection and revenue assurance are available for many crops in the “other” category, however these 
revenue options were seldom selected by producers.  We report parameter estimates for the primary options 
selected.   
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We differentiate by two field practices: summer fallow
 and continuously cropped.
8  By 
aggregating all classes of wheat, the three major crops represent the highest-value insured crops 
grown in the U.S.  The “other crops” category represents other insured crops grown in the 
specific region.
9 
The constant in the estimated equations represents a producer who grew wheat (soybeans 
in Iowa) on a continuously-cropped, non-irrigated field in a specific county, who provided all 
actual yields for the field’s APH in year 2002, and purchased catastrophic coverage or MPCI 
insurance with a 50 percent coverage level.  Thus, we can directly interpret the effect of buy-up 
coverage, revenue insurance, and T-yields on the dependent variable by their estimated 
coefficients.
10 
We use STATA 8.0 to perform the estimation.  Since all models show evidence of 
heteroskedasticity, we use White’s variance estimator to obtain robust standard errors.  Producers 
often operate multiple fields.  Therefore, we do not assume independent and identically 
distributed (IID) sampling error across fields for a single producer.  We do assume IID sampling 
error between producers.  To account for this sampling error structure, we use a robust cluster 
estimator (we cluster on producer) which adjusts the variance for within-cluster correlation 
(Wooldridge 2002).  
                                                 
8 In regions such as Oklahoma and Nebraska, the RMA does not differentiate between winter or spring wheat 
varieties like they do in regions such as Montana and Washington.  Therefore, the crop type “wheat” includes all 
types of wheat.   The RMA makes no distinction in field practice in Oklahoma or Iowa but they do in Montana and 
Nebraska. Except for Washington, where we only analyze observations where the RMA did not identify field 
practice, we differentiate between crop types and field practice where the RMA does. 
9 There are a large number of other potentially insurable crops in each region (e.g., cotton, sorghum, oats, dry beans, 
sunflowers, and dry peas), but many had low numbers of observations.  We focused on crops with a sufficiently 
large number of observations.   
10 Catastrophic coverage insures for a 50 percent coverage level and 55 percent of the price election set by the 
government.  MPCI insurance with 50 percent coverage level insures with either 95 or 100 percent of the price 
election.  
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Serious multicollinearity often occurs when dummy variables are used to represent a 
large number of independent variables.  Using the variance inflation factor (VIF), we checked for 
the presence of multicollinearity in the independent variables.  The VIF measures how inflated 
the variance of the estimated regression coefficients are when compared to independent variables 
not linearly related (Kutner et. al. 2005).  A VIF value of 10 or more indicates that 
multicollinearity may influence the estimates.  We dropped the corn new producer T-yield 
dummy variable from the analysis due to a VIF of 229. 
A positive and significant relationship between a coverage level, insurance type, or T-
yield and the dependent variable suggests that producer opportunism exists.  An insignificant or 
a significantly negative relationship indicates a lack of producer opportunism.  We assess 
marginal impacts on producer opportunism from using more T-yields and using special T-yields 
by measuring their differential effects on estimated producer return. 
To test whether subsidization of crop insurance promotes producer opportunism, we 
determine whether buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, or T-yield parameter estimates are 
significantly greater when the dependent variable is producer return (including the subsidy) than 
when accounting for the full cost of insurance (social return, not including the subsidy).  By 
comparing results between the social return and producer return equations we calculate the 
amount of producer opportunism, if any, contributed by the subsidy.  We implement this test by 
selecting each buy-up coverage level, revenue insurance, or T-yield variable for which the 
estimated parameter supported the hypothesis that producer return increases with the use of buy-
up coverage, revenue insurance, or T-yields (i.e., where producer opportunism was found).  For 
each selected variable, we conduct the test by computing the difference in its parameter estimates 
between the two models:   s p γ γ γ ˆ ˆ   − = Δ , where  p γˆ represents the estimated coefficient with  
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producer return as the dependent variable, and s γˆ represents the estimated coefficient on the same 
variable with social return as the dependent variable.   We compute a Wald test to determine 
whether a significant difference exists.  We calculate this test because, if the subsidy had not 
been available, the producer would have had to pay the total premium to get crop insurance and 
would have received the social return.  This would result in an estimated social producer 
opportunism effect of s γˆ .  However, with the subsidy, the producer only paid the producer 
premium which resulted in the estimated private producer opportunism effect of p γˆ .  A 
significant positive difference between p γˆ  and s γˆ indicates that the subsidy increased producer 
opportunism. 
To permit an examination of the effects of heterogeneity of land resources, our data 
sample is limited to non-irrigated agricultural production.  We supplement the field-level crop 
insurance contract data with county-level annual growing degree-day data (Schlenker and 
Roberts 2006).  Along with county fixed effects, growing degree-day data act as control 
variables for heterogeneity between counties that could come from differences in weather and 
land quality. 
Support for greater producer opportunism in regions with greater within-county land 
resource heterogeneity occurs if the average of all significant buy-up coverage, revenue 
insurance or T-yield parameter estimates is greater for regions with greater within-county land 
resource heterogeneity than for regions with less within-county land resource heterogeneity.  We 
compare evidence by conducting the tests for three crops to the extent relevant in five regions. 
 
Results  
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We present the results for selection of buy-up coverage (55 percent - 85 percent Coverage level 
variables) and revenue insurance (crop rev coverage, income protection, and revenue assurance 
variables) using social return as the dependent variable in Table 2.  We found six significantly 
positive parameter estimates on buy-up coverage for wheat in OK, one for summer-fallow wheat 
in Western NE, two for summer-fallow winter wheat and one each for continuously-cropped 
winter and spring wheat in North-Central MT, three for corn in OK, and five for corn in Western 
NE.
11  For other crops, we identified one significantly positive parameter for cotton in OK, one 
for both summer-fallow and continuously-cropped barley in MT, one for barley in WA, two for 
millet in NE, and one for canola in IA.  We found two significantly positive parameter estimates 
on revenue insurance variables for wheat in OK, one each for both summer-fallow and 
continuously-cropped winter wheat and summer-fallow spring wheat in MT, one for spring 
wheat in WA, one each for corn in NE and IA, and one for soybeans in IA. 
Based on social return, evidence of producer opportunism from the selection of buy-up 
coverage occurs in two of the three major crops (none in soybeans), in all four other crops, and in 
all five growing regions.  Even without the subsidy, there is evidence of producer opportunism 
from selection of revenue insurance in all three major crops and in all five regions. 
Table 3 contains results for selection of buy-up coverage and revenue insurance with 
producer return as the dependent variable.  Producer return and social return provided similar 
results, with a few additional positive and significant parameters when examining producer 
return.  Both producer return and social return provided evidence of producer opportunism from 
the selection of buy-up coverage.  With the exception of soybeans, both producer return and 
social return showed evidence of producer opportunism from insurance type.   
                                                 
11 Hereafter we refer to the regions only by their state abbreviation.  
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As evident from table 3, the value to the producer of producer opportunism varied 
widely, ranging from $1 to $61 dollars per acre for buy-up coverage and from $1 to $17 for 
revenue insurance.  For example, corn in OK provided producers an average return of $61 more 
per acre if the producer selected a 65 percent coverage level rather than a 50 percent coverage 
level.  The average difference was only $1 per acre greater for the same coverage level for NE 
millet producers.  Growing corn in IA or wheat in WA provided no evidence of an increase in 
return from buy-up coverage.  One possible explanation for this difference in producer 
opportunism could be that in OK there exists more opportunity to gain by choice of coverage 
level because favorable growing conditions don’t always exist.  Having higher coverage levels of 
crop insurance in OK results in additional profit for the producer because the additional expected 
benefit outweighs the additional insurance cost. 
We present the results for the impacts of T-yields on social return in Table 4.  We found 
four significantly positive parameter estimates on T-yield variables for wheat in OK, one for 
summer-fallow wheat in NE, four for summer-fallow and three for continuously-cropped winter 
wheat and two for summer-fallow spring wheat in MT, one for winter wheat in WA, one each for 
corn in NE and IA, and two for soybeans in IA.  Three significantly positive parameter estimates 
apply to T-yields in “other crops”, two for cotton in OK and one for canola in IA.  Thus, we 
found evidence of producer opportunism on social return in the use of T-yields for all three 
major crops – wheat, corn, and soybeans, as well as for cotton in OK and canola in IA.  All five 
regions provided evidence of producer opportunism from the use of T-yields in at least one crop. 
Table 5 contains results for T-yields with producer return as the dependent variable.  
Nearly all significant parameters for social return were also significant for producer return.  
Several additional parameters were positive and significant for producer return.  Whether  
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measured in a social sense or a private sense, these results provide considerable evidence that 
producers exercise opportunistic behavior in the use of T-yields when securing crop insurance.  
The value of this producer opportunism ranges between $1 and $9 per acre.  These findings 
support the idea that potential exists for producers in each region to profit by using T-yields to 
participate in the federal crop insurance program or by selecting buy-up coverage or revenue 
insurance.  They lend support to the findings previously noted by Roberts, Key, and 
O’Donoghue (2006), Makki and Somwaru (2001), Just, Calvin, and Quiggin (1999), Smith and 
Goodwin (1996), and Skees and Reed (1986) that producers participate in crop insurance partly 
because of adverse selection and moral hazard possibilities. 
We found no consistent evidence supporting the idea that producer return increases with 
the use of additional T-yields.  For most commodities and regions, there were not a sufficient 
number of significant parameters on T-yields to draw a conclusion or else the evidence was 
ambiguous.  Thus, the county average yield discounts used to create the field’s yield guarantee 
when more than one T-yield is used do not appear to be out of balance with the undiscounted 
county average when only one T-yield is used. 
To test whether the subsidization of crop insurance promotes producer opportunism, we 
computed Wald test statistics on the difference in relevant parameter estimates in equation (1) for 
the two dependent variables – social return and producer return.  Support for the hypothesis was 
provided by a significant positive difference in the coefficient value due to subsidization when 
we found evidence of private producer opportunism.  We report the test statistics for buy-up 
coverage and revenue insurance in table 6.  In dollars per acre, the values in the table represent 
the difference in parameter estimates when producer return and social return are the dependent 
variables.  We found a significant positive difference in 89 percent of the parameter estimate  
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pairs where we identified producer opportunism for buy-up coverage and in 90 percent of the 
parameter estimate pairs for revenue insurance.  Only 4 percent of buy-up coverage and revenue 
insurance would be consistent with the converse hypothesis that the subsidy reduces the amount 
of producer opportunism.  Table 7 contains the test statistics for subsidization of crop insurance 
promoting producer opportunism using T-yields.  The Wald statistics indicate a significant 
positive difference in 52 percent of the parameter estimate pairs where we found producer 
opportunism.  Eleven percent of parameter pairs would have been consistent with the converse 
hypothesis.  Thus, strong evidence suggests that the subsidy increases producer opportunism for 
buy-up coverage and revenue insurance selection but only modest evidence that the subsidy 
increases producer opportunism when using T-yields. 
The value of producer opportunism due to the subsidy for buy-up coverage ranges from 
$0.47 to $11 per acre.  For revenue insurance and T-yields the value of producer opportunism 
ranges from $1 to $2 and from $0.07 to $3 per acre, respectively.  The differences in subsidy 
effect on producer opportunism between buy-up coverage, revenue insurance and T-yields may 
be because the subsidy amount for buy-up coverage changes dramatically between coverage 
levels but much less for revenue insurance and T-yields. 
We also examine whether private producer opportunism due to the use of buy-up 
coverage, revenue insurance, and T-yields increases in regions with greater within-county land 
resource heterogeneity.  We determine whether the more heterogeneous within-county land 
resource regions have a higher expected producer return than regions with more homogeneous 
within-county land resources from selection or use of these options.  OK, MT, and WA have 
greater land heterogeneity than IA and NE.  Results reported in tables 3 and 5 provide the 
parameters used to test this hypothesis.  We examine both the percent of parameters on buy-up  
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coverage, revenue insurance, and T-yields that are significantly positive and their average values.  
Across all crops, we found 33 percent of the estimated parameters on buy-up coverage 
significantly positive with an average estimated producer opportunism of $12.43 in the more 
heterogeneous regions.  These figures compare to 30 percent of parameters with average 
opportunism of $17 in the more homogeneous regions.  For revenue insurance, 70 percent of the 
parameters in the heterogeneous regions were significantly positive with average estimated 
producer opportunism of $7 compared to 38 percent and $5 in the homogenous regions.   For T-
yields, 27 percent of the parameters in the heterogeneous regions were significantly positive with 
average estimated producer opportunism of $3 per acre compared to 19 percent and $2 in the 
homogeneous regions. 
For all options, the percent of significant positive parameters was larger in the more 
heterogeneous regions than in the more homogeneous regions.  Also, for revenue insurance and 
T-yields, the average estimated producer opportunism was greater in the heterogeneous regions 
than in the homogeneous regions.  However, most differences were not very large.  So, while 
evidence generally supports this hypothesis, results do not provide conclusive support. 
 
Conclusions 
We have analyzed an important unintended outcome of the federal crop insurance program, 
producer opportunism.  We examined whether evidence of producer opportunism exists in field-
level crop insurance contract data for several crops in five different regions from the use of buy-
up coverage, revenue insurance, and transitional yields (T-yields).  Reducing producer 
opportunism creates a more efficient risk management program that limits the ability of  
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producers to extract profits from participating.  Our results are important to policy makers 
because they identify the characteristics of insurance that lead to producer opportunism. 
For buy-up coverage, we found evidence of producer opportunism in wheat and corn in 
all five regions.  Estimated opportunism effects from buy-up coverage ranged from trivial to very 
large in size, $1 to $61 per acre.  For buy-up coverage, evidence did not support the hypothesis 
that more heterogeneous land quality increased producer opportunism.  This result suggests that 
an increase in relative producer premium for higher coverage levels is recommended, regardless 
of land quality, to decrease the amount of producer opportunism.  Increasing producer premium 
can be accomplished by either reducing the subsidy or increasing total insurance cost. 
For insurance type, we found evidence of producer opportunism in wheat, corn, and 
soybeans and in all five regions.  Estimated opportunism effects from insurance type were more 
moderate in size, from $1 to $17 per acre.  This result indicates that premium structure for 
insurance type does not fully incorporate necessary information needed to offset opportunistic 
behavior.  We also found greater evidence of producer opportunism in more heterogeneous land 
quality regions.  Revenue insurance may warrant an increase in relative premiums, with a larger 
increase in premiums for producers in heterogeneous regions. 
For T-yields, all three primary crops as well as all five regions showed evidence of 
producer opportunism.  In many cases, the estimated effects were small, in the $1 to $9 per acre 
range.  Further, while we found no consistent evidence that using more T-yields resulted in 
greater producer opportunism, evidence of producer opportunism was greater in the more 
heterogeneous regions.  To address the effect of land quality on establishing APH the RMA has 
done the right thing by starting to assign a specific T-yield to areas within a county that have 
similar land quality.  
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In general our findings provide support for the hypotheses tested in this study.  However, 
some caution is warranted in interpreting the results.  It is possible that some of the evidence of 
producer opportunism could stem from differences in producer ability.  For example, low 
producer ability can lead to expected yields lower than the county average just as poorer agro-
climatic conditions can.   If the ability of producers is inversely correlation with use of T-yields, 
our estimates of producer opportunism in using T-yields would be biased upward.  It is also 
possible that fields that receive frequent indemnity payments are receiving larger expected 
returns from crop insurance than fields that seldom receive an indemnity.  If this is true then 
increased premium amounts should focus on fields with frequent indemnities. 
With such caveats, our results provide four important implications relevant to 
policymakers.  First, we have documented that buy-up coverage, revenue insurance, and the use 
of T-yields can potentially increase expected income of producers.  Second, evidence suggests 
that producer opportunism exists in all three major crops but the amount of producer 
opportunism varies between crops.  Third, evidence suggests that the subsidization of crop 
insurance increases the level of producer opportunism possibilities, especially for buy-up 
coverage and revenue insurance.  Fourth, evidence suggests that producer opportunism 
possibilities from exercising these options in regions with relatively homogeneous soils provide 
similar results when compared to regions with more heterogeneous soils.  Each of these findings 
implies that crop insurance may be prone to producer opportunism issues.  Information from this 
study provides the FCIC evidence that crop insurance contracts warrant redesign considerations 
to remove the opportunistic possibilities. 
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Table 1. Variable Description 
Variable Name  Variable Definition 
Producer Return  (indemnity – producer premium)/ acres insured 
Social Return  (indemnity – total premium)/ acres insured 
Growing Degree Days  county average number of growing degree days above 20 degrees Celsius. 
County  A matrix of dummy variables for each county.   
Year  A matrix of dummy variables for each year: 1995 to 2002.   
Crop  Dummy variables specific for each crop. 
Coverage level  A matrix of dummy variables for each coverage level; between 50% and 85% in 5% increments. 
Insurance Type  A matrix of dummy variables for producer selection of: multiple peril crop insurance, crop 
revenue coverage, revenue assurance, or income protection. 
MPCI  Multiple Peril Crop Insurance 
Crop Rev Coverage  Crop Revenue Coverage Insurance 
Field Practice  A dummy variable if field was cropped the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
T-yields  A matrix of dummy variables where column “t” =1 if “t” number of T-yields were used, t = 1, 2, 
3, 4, 0 otherwise. 
New Producer  A dummy variable if the producer is a new producer. 
New practice, type, or 
variety 
A dummy variable if the producer used a new practice, type, or variety on additional land that has 
no production history in the crop. 
OK Oklahoma 
MT North-Central  Montana 
WA Eastern  Washington 
NE Western  Nebraska 
IA Iowa 
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Table 2.  Buy-up Coverage and Revenue Insurance Parameter Estimates with Social 
Return as the Dependent Variable 
a 
Crop Coverage  Level  or 
Revenue Insurance 
Region 
OK North-Central  MT  Eastern 
WA 












55% Coverage  0.36  ──  ── 
b -4.41  0.41 
60% Coverage  3.83*  ──  ── -2.96  -0.78  -0.72 
65% Coverage  1.77*  ──  ── -0.55  -1.51  -2.04 
70% Coverage  2.66*  ──  ── 2.41*  -1.85  -2.15 
75% Coverage  3.89*  ──  ── 2.85 -2.24  -2.83 
80% Coverage  7.12*  ──  ── -0.37  -1.43  -4.02 
85% Coverage  7.14*  ──  ── 16.88  4.20 -3.64 
Crop Rev Coverage   1.89*  ──  ── 1.82 -0.69  1.08 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 2.35* 
Revenue Assurance   4.55*  ──  ──  ──  ── -1.20 
Winter 
Wheat  
55% Coverage  ── -0.61 
b -0.27  ──  ── 
60% Coverage  ── -10.28 
b -1.25  ──  ── 
65% Coverage  ── -1.20  -3.48  -1.24  ──  ── 
70% Coverage  ── -1.27  -2.59  -1.48  ──  ── 
75% Coverage  ──  5.47* 2.69 -1.56  ──  ── 
80% Coverage  ──  18.83* 15.27* -2.36  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ── 15.75  2.79  -0.79  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage  ── 15.40*  7.88*  0.40  ──  ── 
Spring 
Wheat 
55% Coverage  ── -3.03  -0.99  -0.58  ──  ── 
60% Coverage  ── -2.96  -1.74  -2.05  ──  ── 
65% Coverage  ── -0.62  0.79  -1.41  ──  ── 
70% Coverage  ── 0.46  1.89* -1.40  ──  ── 
75% Coverage  ── 0.71  0.96  -0.86  ──  ── 
80% Coverage  ── 3.77  -10.97  -3.28  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ── 15.22 
b -2.05  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage  ── 5.85*  0.47  3.67*  ──  ── 
Corn 55%  Coverage 
b  ──  ── 9.87  -0.92 
60% Coverage  -4.45  ──  ── 9.39  -1.39 
65% Coverage  55.43*  ──  ── 5.04*  -3.32 
70% Coverage  17.80*  ──  ── 22.15*  -4.67 
75% Coverage  44.21*  ──  ── 23.52*  -6.29 
80% Coverage 
b  ──  ── 36.10*  -9.54 
85% Coverage 
b  ──  ── 40.06*  -7.95 
Crop Rev Coverage   -2.73  ──  ── 9.50* 
b 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ── 3.74* 
Revenue Assurance  
b  ──  ──  ── -1.89 
Other 55%  Coverage  -2.78  11.44*  9.97  -0.54  -4.93  1.24* 
60% Coverage  1.28  -4.53  1.53  -1.57  4.70 
b 
65%  Coverage  6.63*  -0.74 -0.85 -0.84  0.41  -0.66 
70%  Coverage  -13.37  -0.42 -0.01 -0.14  6.37*  -2.62 
75%  Coverage  -10.91  -0.14 -3.60 -0.48  13.21*  -2.49 
80% Coverage  ── -5.26  -19.10  3.18*  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ── 
b 23.93*  2.20  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage   -6.59  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
b 
Revenue Assurance  
b  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
No. of Observ.  90869  55286  44921  47444  186654 
 Note: * implies parameter is significant at the 0.05 level.   
a Units are in dollars per acre.   
b Variable was available to producers but dropped due to lack of observations fitting the variables criteria.    
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Table 3.  Buy-up Coverage and Revenue Insurance Parameter Estimates with Producer 
Return as the Dependent Variable 
a 
Crop Coverage  Level  or 
Revenue Insurance 
Region 
OK North-Central  MT  Eastern 
WA 












55% Coverage  0.77  ──  ── 
b -4.32  0.41 
60% Coverage  4.45*  ──  ── -3.07  -0.17  -0.67 
65% Coverage  2.46*  ──  ── 0.05  -0.84 -1.17 
70% Coverage  4.33*  ──  ── 4.18*  -0.44 -0.84 
75% Coverage  5.65*  ──  ── 5.77*  -0.05 -0.80 
80% Coverage  9.21*  ──  ── 2.28  1.35 -1.23 
85% Coverage  6.92*  ──  ── 25.25*  8.84  -0.55 
Crop Rev Coverage   2.81*  ──  ── 2.90*  -0.18  0.28 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 1.51 
Revenue Assurance   5.51*  ──  ──  ──  ── -0.73 
Winter 
Wheat  
55% Coverage  ── -0.09 
b -0.31  ──  ── 
60% Coverage  ── -10.05 
b -0.98  ──  ── 
65% Coverage  ── -0.16  -2.36  -0.89  ──  ── 
70% Coverage  ── 0.35 -0.78  -0.95  ──  ── 
75% Coverage  ── 7.01* 5.54*  -1.00  ──  ── 
80% Coverage  ── 22.45* 18.87*  -0.93  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ── 20.82  9.66*  0.82  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage  ── 16.74*  9.30*  1.45*  ──  ── 
Spring 
Wheat 
55% Coverage  ── -3.39  -1.03  -0.64  ──  ── 
60% Coverage  ── -2.49  -1.28  -2.07  ──  ── 
65% Coverage  ── 0.27  1.86*  -1.08  ──  ── 
70% Coverage  ── 1.62* 3.40*  -0.71  ──  ── 
75% Coverage  ── 2.13* 2.62*  -0.18  ──  ── 
80% Coverage  ── 6.44*  -7.13  -1.14  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ── 17.32 
b 0.32  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage  ── 6.80* 1.60  5.20*  ──  ── 
Corn 55%  Coverage 
b  ──  ── 10.88 -1.17 
60% Coverage  2.72  ──  ── 10.95 -1.11 
65% Coverage  61.04*  ──  ── 5.88*  -2.32 
70% Coverage  25.64*  ──  ── 24.63*  -3.06 
75% Coverage  55.11*  ──  ── 27.92*  -3.40 
80% Coverage 
b  ──  ── 44.11*  -4.63 
85% Coverage 
b  ──  ── 48.48*  -2.78 
Crop Rev Coverage   -1.95  ──  ── 10.82* 
b 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ── 1.99* 
Revenue Assurance  
b  ──  ──  ── -0.69 
Other 55%  Coverage  -1.78  11.24*  10.00  -0.82  -4.05  0.94* 
60% Coverage  3.34  -4.67  2.05  -1.52  4.95* 
b 
65% Coverage  8.34*  0.12  0.10  -0.60  0.87*  0.62 
70%  Coverage  -7.69  0.82 1.49 0.31  7.51*  -1.81 
75% Coverage  0.33  1.35  -2.30  0.18  17.45*  -0.75 
80% Coverage  ── -1.72 -14.15  3.92*  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ── 
b 27.70*  3.26*  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage   -2.53  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
b 
Revenue Assurance  
b  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Note: * implies parameter is significant at the 0.05 level.   
a Units are in dollars per acre.   
b Variable was available to producers but dropped due to lack of observations fitting the variables criteria.   
  








Number of or type of 
T-yield(s) 
Region 
OK North-Central  MT  Eastern 
WA 












4 T-Yields  -1.08  ──  ── 0.29  -2.10  -0.36 
3 T-Yields  -1.64  ──  ── -0.10  -3.67  -0.73 
2 T-Yields  0.50*  ──  ── -1.69  -3.13  -0.26 
1 T-Yield  1.09*  ──  ── -0.76  -3.36  0.29 
New Producer  5.47*  ──  ── 2.27*  -1.80  1.54* 
New practice, type, 
or variety  1.89* 
                          
── 
         
── -1.09  -2.97  1.15* 
Winter 
Wheat 
4 T-Yields  ── 1.26*  1.12  -0.48  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ── 1.26*  3.08*  0.14  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  ── 1.34  1.44  0.34  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  ── 1.38* -0.74  0.55  ──  ── 
New Producer  ── 2.61  4.00*  3.78*  ──  ── 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
           
── 5.46*  5.22*  -0.32 
                             
── 




4 T-Yields  ── 0.56  -2.60  -0.82  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ── 0.06  -2.99  -1.25  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  ── 1.24* -1.18  -1.26  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  ── -0.62  -0.68  -0.80  ──  ── 
New Producer  ── 1.70  0.60  -1.66  ──  ── 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
           
── 2.46* -1.06  -1.74 
                             
── 
         
── 
Corn 4  T-Yields  -20.24  ──  ── -2.36 -1.52 
3 T-Yields  -11.37  ──  ── -9.26  0.07 
2 T-Yields  -17.08  ──  ── -13.85  0.21 
1 T-Yield  -17.85  ──  ── -11.34  0.43 
New Producer  #  ──  ── -5.32  2.55* 
New practice, type, 
or variety  -18.47 
                         
── 
         
── 5.49*  0.58 
Other 4  T-Yields  -5.33  0.37  -2.17  -0.54  -0.59  -0.23 
3 T-Yields  -5.18  0.46  -1.58  -0.09  -2.82  0.02 
2 T-Yields  -6.41  0.31  -0.49  -0.47  -3.46  1.13 
1 T-Yield  -5.52  -1.23  -1.90  0.27  -4.58  1.55 
New Producer  3.90*  -0.33  -2.60  -0.58  -3.25  2.74* 
New practice, type, 
or variety  5.99*  -1.78  -2.24  0.69  0.43  -1.87 
No. of 
Observ. 
 90869 55286  44921  47444 186654 
Note: * implies parameter is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 # implies coefficient not estimated due to high VIF. 
a Units are in dollars per acre.   
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Number of or type of 
T-yield(s)  
Region 
OK North-Central  MT  Eastern 
WA 












4 T-Yields  -0.73  ──  ── 0.51 -1.18  -0.08 
3 T-Yields  -1.48  ──  ── 0.04 -3.39  -0.62 
2 T-Yields  0.61*  ──  ── -1.40  -2.83  -0.23 
1 T-Yield  1.16*  ──  ── -0.37  -2.76 0.29 
New Producer  5.46*  ──  ── 2.86*  -0.78  1.66* 
New practice, type, 
or variety  1.83* 
                          
── 
         
── -0.45  -2.33 1.02* 
Winter 
Wheat  
4 T-Yields  ── 1.39* 1.10 -0.35  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ── 1.43* 2.96* 0.26*  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  ── 1.57  1.94* 0.45  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  ── 1.47* 0.80  0.68  ──  ── 
New Producer  ──  2.84 3.84 3.98*  ──  ── 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
          
── 5.80* 4.81*  -0.01 
                             
── 




4 T-Yields  ── 0.76*  -2.62 -0.63  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ── 0.23 -2.93 -1.08  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  ── 1.42*  -1.21 -1.22  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  ──  -0.51 -0.59 -0.75  ──  ── 
New Producer  ── 1.98  0.94 -1.29  ──  ── 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
          
── 2.52*  -1.46 -1.40 
                            
── 
         
── 
Corn 4  T-Yields  -20.33  ──  ── -2.04  -1.00 
3 T-Yields  -10.36  ──  ── -9.39 0.41 
2 T-Yields  -17.47  ──  ── -14.05  0.32 
1 T-Yield  -16.00  ──  ── -11.20  0.65* 
New Producer  #  ──  ── -5.23 2.92* 
New practice, type, 
or variety  -16.51 
                         
── 
         
── 5.52*  0.57 
Other  4  T-Yields  -5.67  0.36 -1.94 -0.38  -0.33  0.01 
3  T-Yields  -5.15  0.41  -1.43  0.09 -2.56 0.16 
2  T-Yields  -6.49  0.24 -0.34 -0.37  -2.89  1.37 
1 T-Yield  -5.07  -1.51  -1.89  0.35  -3.72  2.11* 
New  Producer  5.32*  -0.47 -2.57 -0.42  -3.00  2.79* 
New practice, type, 
or variety  8.85*  -2.17  -2.54  1.16*  0.47  -1.79 
Note: * implies parameter is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 # implies coefficient not estimated due to high VIF. 
a Units are in dollars per acre.   
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Table 6.  Estimated Amount of Buy-up Coverage and Revenue Insurance Producer 




Coverage Level or 
Revenue Insurance 
Region 
OK North-Central  MT  Eastern 
WA 












55% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
60% Coverage  0.62*  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
65% Coverage  0.69*  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
70% Coverage  1.67*  ──  ── 1.77*  ──  ── 
75% Coverage  1.76*  ──  ── 2.95*  ──  ── 
80% Coverage  2.09*  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  -0.22  ──  ── 8.37*  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage   0.92*  ──  ── 1.08*  ──  ── 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Revenue Assurance   0.96*  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Winter 
Wheat  
55% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
60% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
65% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
70% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
75% Coverage  ── 1.54* 2.85* ──  ──  ── 
80% Coverage  ── 3.62* 3.60* ──  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ──  ── 3.87*  ──  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage  ── 1.34* 1.42* 1.05*  ──  ── 
Spring 
Wheat 
55% Coverage    ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
60% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
65% Coverage  ──  ── 1.07*  ──  ──  ── 
70% Coverage  ── 1.16* 1.51* ──  ──  ── 
75% Coverage  ── 1.42* 1.66* ──  ──  ── 
80% Coverage  ── 2.66*  ──  ──  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage  ── 0.95*  ── 1.53*  ──  ── 
Corn 55%  Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
60% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
65% Coverage  5.61*  ──  ── 0.84*  ── 
70% Coverage  7.84*  ──  ── 2.48*  ── 
75% Coverage  10.90*  ──  ── 4.40*  ── 
80% Coverage  ──  ──  ── 8.01*  ── 
85% Coverage  ──  ──  ── 8.42*  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage   ──  ──  ── 1.32*  ── 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ── -1.75* 
Revenue Assurance   ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Other 55%  Coverage  ── -0.19  ──  ──  ── -0.30* 
60% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ── 0.25 ── 
65% Coverage  1.71*  ──  ──  ── 0.47*  ── 
70% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ── 1.14*  ── 
75% Coverage  ──  ──  ──  ── 4.24*  ── 
80% Coverage  ──  ──  ── 0.74*  ──  ── 
85% Coverage  ──  ── 3.77*  1.06*  ──  ── 
Crop Rev Coverage   ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Income Protection   ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Revenue Assurance   ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
Note: * implies parameter is significant at the 0.05 level. 
a Units are in dollars per acre.   
  
  32 
 
 




Number of or type 
of T-yield(s) 
Region 
OK North-Central  MT  Eastern 
WA 












4 T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  0.11*  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  0.07*  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
New Producer  -0.01  ──  ── 0.59*  ── 0.12* 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
                  
-0.06 
                          
── 
         
── 
              
── 
               
── 




4 T-Yields  ── 0.13  ──  ──  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ── 0.17*  -0.12  0.12*  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  ──  ── 0.50*  ──  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  ── 0.09  ──  ──  ──  ── 
New Producer  ──  ──  ── 0.20  ──  ── 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
             
── 
                      
-2.94* 
                      
-0.41 
         
── 
                            
── 




4 T-Yields  ── -0.20* ──  ──  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  ── 0.18*  ──  ──  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
New Producer  ──  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
             
── 
                    
0.06 
             
── 
         
── 
                             
── 
         
── 
Corn 4  T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  ──  ──  ──  ── 0.22* 
New Producer  ──  ──  ──  ── 0.37* 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
             
── 
                         
── 
         
── 
                                              
0.03 
         
── 
Other 4  T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
3 T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
2 T-Yields  ──  ──  ──  ──  ── 
1 T-Yield  ──  ──  ──  ── 0.05* 
New Producer  1.42*  ──  ──  ── 0.08 
New practice, type, 
or variety 
                
2.86* 
                         
── 
                
0.47* 
                             
── 
         
── 
Note: * implies parameter is significant at the 0.05 level. 
a Units are in dollars per acre.   
 